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LAW'S OWN ONTOLOGY
A COMMENT ON LAW'S QUANDARY
Joseph Vining+

This is the last sentence of Steven Smith's elegant book, Law's
Quandary: "[I]n the meantime ... we would perhaps be wise to confess
our confusion and to acknowledge that there are richer realities and
greater powers in the universe than our meager modern philosophies
I
have dreamed of."
Being taken to this in the end justifies a life of work in law, which
today especially needs constant defense and justification. For some the
highest reason and sufficient justification is working toward peace,
simply peace among people and, now, peace between us and the sentient
world beyond us and even the earth itself. Justice is its highest reward
for others. But for many more than would admit it-I myself might say
all-the deep reward, the justification, for working in law is in this last
sentence, to be brought even against one's own resistance to the
anteroom of what we now call "belief" and there, in the end, to a more
confident sense of one's own substance and reality that everyone thirsts
for in and out of law. The late poet Czeslaw Milosz, who struggled with
his own beliefs throughout his life, liked to quote Pascal, that "to deny, to
believe, and to doubt absolutely- this is for man what running is for a
horse." 2 Smith's book runs like a horse.
It runs and takes us with it because there is such a voice in it, that
brings us as readers closer to the subject of the search he undertakes,
"performatively" as it were. Law, if it is law, is authoritative, and the
authoritative is voice, voice heard. And the book takes us along so well
through fields of denial, belief, and doubting because it has a clearly
maintained structure that makes you want to read it through, in the way
the very structure itself of piece of music contributes to your continuing
to listen.
At the beginning Smith sets out commonly shared ontologies,
languages, or terms used in describing what is real in the world around us
or in the universe, to which we have been exposed in the twentieth
century and which anyone growing up in the twenty-first century inherits,
and to which we necessarily turn in discussing and solving our problems
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in making sense of the world and deciding what to do individually or
jointly.
There are three, the ontologies of mundane, everyday
experience, of science including mathematics, and of religion. He calls
them, nicely, "ontological lumberyards."
He then shows law, living, functioning, and inescapably there, but
working in a way that cannot be understood or explained if its
practitioners are in fact confining themselves to the first two of his
ontological lumberyards, mundane everyday experience, and modern
science. This brings him and us to the question of faith or belief in
realities not found in either one.
I should like to comment on both these strengths of the book, its voice
and its structure, and then turn briefly to the special problem of the
"constructive author" of the law to which the last part of the book is
devoted.
AUTHORITY

First, voice, and the connection between voice, the phenomenon of
authority, and the existence of law. The book's initial and continuing
question, obviously felt but sometimes jauntily put as from a jester in the
corner, is what is "the law" to which there is such constant reference and
appeal? Is it something real, in and of itself? Does it exist, and if so how
and in what way? All act as if it does, really does. But is there more than
"as if" which is a pretense?-so that, to quote Smith on page 80, "the law
is a sort of large-scale conspiracy to defraud the public and to preserve
for the legal profession power that the public would not be willing to
grant if it understood what is really going on"?
A straightforward answer to this straightforward question is that "the
law" exists, it is real, it has effects on us and the world, if and when it is
heard and attended to in all the swirl of voices in our heads including
what we initially think of as our own. We regularly say that something in
the legal world has been reduced to a "dead letter." We regularly say
something in the legal world has become "fictional." But I think we do
not say there is nothing, ever, that raises the thought of willing obedience
or good faith response.
·
So I might suggest that when what is spoken of as "the law" has
authority, it exists in the human world, is really there, and when it has no
authority and is either ignored with a "So what, catch me if you can," or
evaded through imagination, cleverness, and application, it is dead and
with us only as the dead are. The question of "the reality of the law" and
whether the law actually has a name when someone purports to speak
"in the name of the law" can alternatively be put as the question, "What
is the reality of authority, the reality of willing obedience?" Smith's
discussion is often explicit in this regard and bears emphasizing, to bring
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out of the shadows what is implicit for purposes of further discussion the
book will generate. There is for instance a phrase that is repeated in the
book, "how the law actually works." If we ask what does "work" mean
in "how the law actually works," the answer would not be a description
of the details of the processes of legal proceedings and legal institutions,
but the bringing about of good-faith joint effort. That is when law
"works."
The reality of authority is not force, which would blend into a scientific
ontology. I or others who say "it is not force" do not need, I think, to
prove that force is ultimately inadequate. The unfoldingness and
unpredictability of human life is enough to counter the contrary, that
"force alone is real." What allows not only any one of us but humanity
itself to navigate the material world is creativity, individual, then joint,
then individual again. Authority unleashes creativity and pursuit of a
purpose that is not just an individual purpose and that takes more than
an individual arm and more than any merely calculating mind to achieve.
We can all be confident of this, certainly all of us in law, even though so
many who are the flower of contemporary university training devote
their lives to trying to prove that a merely calculating mind can reach all
there is or can be.
References to authority run through Law's Quandary. Authority
makes an appearance on page 60, is taken up again in discussion of legal
method on page 95 and again in the discussion of constructed authors on
page 129, the phrase there being "authoritative guidance." It is
inattention to the question of authority that makes what Smith calls
"other paradigms" after the "classical" stumble as they have been
advanced one by one during the twentieth century-legal "realism" (the
opposite, we can note, of mathematical "realism," which is Platonic), or
legal "positivism" sparked by a quasi-scientific and literalist view of
language, or "law and policy" including economics, or "law and
philosophy." On page 151, through his discussion of baseball and chess,
Smith points out what those who have an impression of law really being
rules (like the rules of games, or of arithmetic) do not immediately see,
their own reliance on authority, and on the method used to reach it and
the presuppositions of that method, as they go about working on law's
"substantive content" and saying what they think the law says. The
absence of authority is why, on pages 168-69, Smith finds Platonism as an
ontological resource insufficient for law. Mathematical objects, however
real and there to be discovered, do not command, especially not action or
restraint of action.

698

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 55:695

The question of authority, and of resistance and evasion, shadows any
3
discussion of law. Authority is surely also a problem. Understanding it
and its place and how it enters is perhaps more difficult today than in the
past, though any sense that this is the case may only be a reflection of the
quandary Smith presents. But foregrounding it even as a problem helps
open law's own ontological contributions to view.
LA W'S ONTOLOGY

My second comment is on the structure of the book. It is very simply
that, in the book, law itself is not among the modern ontological
lumberyards Smith describes at the beginning, the mundane, the
scientific, and the religious. Those in law, practicing law or speaking for
or about law, are presented in the book as looking out from law to what
ontological supplies there are in the lumberyards available. The
limitations or absences in the lumberyards marked ordinary life and
modern science produce the "ontological gap" in which law finds itselfa memorable and effective phrase-and bring us to the edge of the third
"ontological family" those in law might look out to, the resources of
religious thought, belief, imagination, and experience.
This structure, which is a process of elimination, is a strength of the
book and part of its persuasive power. It is very different from the form
I adopted in a book of mine, that Smith actually describes on page 171,
4
with some amusement, as a "self-consciously meandering method." But
certainly if you do think of law as empty or derivative, or as a set of rules,
a game, or, worse, as an opiate or a conspiracy, then presenting to you at
the beginning the thought that the legal mind is something to be
reckoned with on its own terms would be unwise. It would be a drag on
any hope that you will stay with the argument to the end. As with any
injured person to whose inner resources one wants to appeal, gentling
you along is the effective course.
Now such characterizations of legal thought, empty in itself, derivative,
are heavily concentrated in academic writing, as Smith notes frequently.
When Smith or others of us, myself included, use the pronoun "we" or
"us" in discussing law and its problems we are always in danger of
conflating academe with the wider world. There is a picture of the world
and of ourselves taught by so many, implicitly and explicitly (and not
only in the physical and social sciences), that it might be broadbrushed as
"the academic picture." It is definite enough. The teaching, with
3. See, e.g., AFrER AUTHORITY (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., forthcoming).
4. I defended it, in "A Note on Form" at the end, as presenting the legal form of
thought in the only way experience so connected to action, and so connected to an
individual's own identity in the world, would not be lost in the presentation. See JOSEPH
VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 357 (1995).
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examinations of course on how well it can be reproduced, is that the
world we live in is entirely a world of systems and processes, and that we
ourselves are only expressions of the interaction between the systems
within us and the systems around us. "Complex adaptive systems" we
are sometimes called, or "emergent properties" of systems, who are to be
seen in turn as parts of higher order systems. Though the scientific
community, in which this picture takes its strongest and most explicit
form, does not like seeing itself and the cumulative insights of scientific
investigation in these terms, the picture, that "this is all there is," we find
all around us in academic life presented as the objective truth that
ultimately all will come to embrace.
But law is not academic. The university is not its home. Law is in the
wider world and is pervasive there, in language, thought, and action.
Every order given in a corporation, and every defense or challenge to it,
every exercise of authority based on the law of property, and every
defense or challenge to it, every encounter with an administrative
agency, takes what we might think of as mundane or ordinary talk,
decision, and action into the world of law, into law's language, and into
the legal form of thought. Everyone is imbued with it.
Noting the danger of conflating academe with the wider world is not to
deny the wisdom of the structure Smith chose for the book. But if you
begin to contemplate law as itself an ontological resource, in addition to
the mundane, the scientific or mathematical, and the religious, the
consequence of the book's structure becomes clear-our looking at the
end, by a process of elimination, only to the ontology of religious life.
Of course in pointing to law's home in the wider world and to how
much a turn to law and the legal form of thought is part of ordinary life, I
raise the possibility that instead of being left at the edge of religious life
looking forward, we might look back. The legal form of thought might
be merged into ordinary life in our understanding of it, and the ontology
of it put in the family dynasty Smith designates as the mundane. But vast
numbers are also imbued with thought and perception we call religious.
When we speak of the religious we are not looking to the mentality of a
limited professional group. We are talking of the ordinary. But we do
not for that reason collapse the religious into the mundane. Instead we
tend to see, with Cardinal Newman, the extraordinariness of the
ordinary. In something of the same way the ontology of law goes beyond
that of ordinary life, and I think that is Smith's view here also.
So let us look forward to the resources or "lumberyard" of religious
life, then to the remaining of Smith's alternatives, the scientific, and then
to what can be said for looking to law itself.
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LAW AND THE COMMITMENTS OF RELIGION

Smith begins with an overarching sense of law, "classical" or
"traditional," preceding the developments of the twentieth century. One
view, which he outlines, is that this overarching sense depended upon
and linked human law to divine law with divine judgment and sanction. 5
This is a conclusion about the past, especially the just-pre-twentieth
century past, that I myself have to be wrestled toward. I recognize that I
may mix current perception, including my own, with what predecessors
actually thought a century ago, and that establishing and understanding
the substance of their thought is something intellectual historians trained
as such offer to do for us. But intellectual history is not the same as
lawyers looking back, if only because of the disengagement from idea or
belief intellectual history displays and perhaps·must display.
Rather than depending on and linking to divine law and judgment, the
"classical account," which reappears at the end of Law's Quandary as the
"neoclassical," may present human law as having affinities with or
sisterly resemblances to the practices, language, and self-reflections of
religious life. They can remain affinities or sisterly resemblances
however religious one's sense of the origins of the capacities that permit
us to do what we do, work the way we do. "The law" and the persons
that populate the world of law may be this side of the Divine though
irreducible to individual human beings. The caring mind that is
presupposed and sought in seeking to know or speak for law need not be,
indeed cannot be a mind that comprehends the universe. The value of
the individual in law-or the push for it, or the presumption of it-does
lose force without a warrant that transcends anything human, to which
the twentieth century is a witness.
But in general and as an
"overarching" matter, I have sought and I wonder whether Smith and
others do not also seek an understanding of what an inclusive "we" do
and think in law that someone without or before an ultimate
commitment to the Divine could open herself or himself to.
Such a commitment is I think a very individual matter, quite apart
from the size of the gap there may be, before such a commitment,
between one's actual faith and what one says or says to oneself one

5. Smith describes this view as seeing in the pre-twentieth century understanding a
"theistically oriented metaphysics positing God as a sort of transcendent Legislator and
the hidden source even of human law." As examples he refers to Fortesque in the
fifteenth century ("'all laws that are promulgated by man are decreed by God"') and
Blackstone in the eighteenth ('"This law of nature, ... being ... dictated by God himself,
... such (human laws] as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately
or immediately, from this original."'). SMITH, supra note 1, at 47 (quoting SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE, ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 7 (Shelley Lockwood ed.,
1997) (1471), and WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *41).
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believes. Working with and in law, dealing constantly with suffering,
purpose, authority, and authenticity, may open one to faith that is larger
and deeper than the faith practiced in law. Working naturally with the
personal beyond and behind any individual or individual life may make it
only natural to look beyond that too. But, again, it is the individual that
looks and says "Yes," and this is not a matter of perception only but of
orientation of life and acceptance of demands over and above those of
law.
There is, too, a question underlying my own sense that in the anteroom
of religious life to which Smith brings us there is ontological lumber of
law's own-a question whether translation of it into religious terms can
sit well with faith in our freedom and acceptance of our own
responsibility for what we do and fail to do. The longer the perspective,
what we fail to do seems the more important; and the very contemplation
in law of "inaction," "omission," "negligence," and "criminal negligence"
is connected to the real possibility of initiative instead of mere response,
connected to purpose that may be in law's own lumberyard and to living
value (though now "lumber" has the disadvantage of its deadness, to be
put beside its evocatory advantage in pointing to what we construct and
create). And what we do not fail to do, what we do manage, is connected
to the question of authority shadowing all work in law, authority there in
its degrees making possible joint initiative and joint purpose, and
connected thus to the responsibility we ourselves bear as individuals
when we undertake to speak and act in a position of authority.
Even the fundamental values that animate initiative and by which
responsibility is measured, that are real in some sense in ordinary life and
real in some sense in law (and not real at all in "scientific" ontology), do
not seem to me best seen as drawing their reality directly from what is
beyond the anteroom of religious faith. I think it is fair to say, just as a
matter of observation, that they have something like life themselves. Not
only ordinary talk but the considered language of law and lawyers speaks
of "respect" for a value, "regard" for a value, no-respect and disregardlanguage used when an individual or an animal is concerned, a living
sentient being. "Life," "living," "to be alive," does more than arguably
have for us an element of the transcendental. Nonetheless it is our work
that keeps living value alive, in the same way that it is our work that
keeps a person we hear and perceive real for us and alive to us.
LAW AND ONTOLOGICAL STATEMENTS IN SCIENCE

When we turn to the remaining ontological family in Law's Quandary,
the scientific and mathematical, we see how overt the ontological is all
around us in contemporary scientific and mathematical description and
discussion and how justified Smith is in taking the bold step of speaking
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openly here about "reality." Ontological claims are signaled generally by
the verbs "is" and "exists" and of course by the adverb "really." They
may be negative or positive. For instance, a prominent philosopher of
science writing recently on "mathematical infinity" for general readers6
speaks of "serious doubts about whether it really exists," of his
personally not accepting that mathematical procedures "give rise to
actual infinities," and of the paradoxes that "seem[] to follow once such
completed infinities were thought of as real." He goes on to ask, "[H]ow
can we seriously suppose that infinite sets really exist?" Or a prominent
physicist, pleading recently to the general reader for greater
understanding and acceptance of "indirect scientific evidence," presents
"field theory" as "the theory I use that . . . describes objects existing
throughout space that create and destroy particles." She speaks of
"observing" as "involving a train of theoretical logic by which we can
interpret what is 'seen"' and, with regard to space and the dimensions of
space, "establish the existence of extra dimensions." In the end she turns
to a form of majority rule, "the bulk of the scientific community"
determining the "true story," but that her own positive claims are
7
"ontological" in character is evident.
"Do I believe in extra
dimensions?" she writes elsewhere. "I confess I do .... Sometimes ... an
idea seems like it must contain a germ of truth .... I suddenly realized
that I really believed that some form of extra dimensions must exist. " 8
Against this background of overt ontology we can slip into law's with
an example that I think cuts across the scientific, the legal, and the
religious.
A New York Times op-ed comment9 on the recent
documentary on the Antarctic emperor penguin, March of the Penguins,
argued with approval that we have become more comfortable calling
what we see there "love." The comment was of the kind that proposes
easing or eliminating the line between human beings and animals by
pulling us across it toward them, rather than them across it toward us.
"I've long known the story of the emperor penguins," the commentator
says, "having told it to generations of biology students as a textbook
example of adaptation . . . . In a broad physiological sense, we are
practically identical not only with other mammals but also with birds ...
except for differences in detail of particular design specifications."
Then comes the ontological statement of interest. "Functionally," he
says, "I suspect love is an often temporary chemical imbalance of the
6. David Papineau, Room for One More, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 16, 2003, at
54 (reviewing DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, EVERYTHING AND MORE: A COMPACT
HISTORY OF (2005)).
7. See Lisa Randall, Op-Ed, Dangling Particles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at 13.
8. LISA RANDALL, WARPED PASSAGES 3 (2005).
9. Bernd Heinrich, Op-Ed, Talk to the Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at Al9.
00
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brain induced by sensory stimuli that causes us to maintain focus on
something that carries an adaptive agenda." The ontological claim is
made by the "is" in "love is .... " It is modified slightly by his term
"functionally," but the point of his commentary is to urge us, the "us"
that appears in his definition of love, not to be shy about using the word
"love" for what moves the penguin-what moves the penguin need be no
different from what moves us, an often temporary chemical imbalance of
the brain that is adaptive.
This is a textbook example of ontology that wishes to be thought
scientific, chosen for wide publication. To reflect here for a moment on
how law might approach this statement and claim may bring out aspects
of what I would want to call law's own ontology.
What would the legal mind do with a statement like this, in thinking
about coming to some conclusion about love? In law we are all
witnesses, as I think we also are very much in personal life. When
presented in law with this sentence about love, there would be interest in
what this same individual said at home, what he meant when heard to say
"I love you" to his wife, child, friend, or sister. Putting the two
statements together, the one made at home and the one made
professionally, as would be done in cross-examination on a witness stand,
a lawyer or jury would conclude either that the word "love" in the one
statement, made in class when teaching the penguin's love as a textbook
example of a system operating in an adaptive way, means something
different from "love" in the other statement at home; or, if the two words
are meant to convey the same, that he doesn't believe what he is saying
in class, in which case it would not affect thinking about love, any more
than any witness's statement shown on cross-examination to be one in
which he does not believe is taken seriously. 10
Law does not have a special sense of love, though if law did, it would
be expressed in John Noonan's very beautiful response to Richard
Posner's view of moral and political theory. 11 But law does not stop with
a scientific sense of love, if this teaching is in any way an example of it.
Law could not stop with the scientific, not because law is intrinsically
ordinary on the one hand or religious on the other, but because of law's
own various underlying commitments that can be fairly called
ontological: commitment to looking to all the evidence in a way neither
10. As for the thought he might consistently conceive of love and himself this latter
way, law would hear him speaking in asking for trust and authority as a teacher, and
speaking also in what he does, in his gestures and in his self-restraint toward those he says
he loves.
11. John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV.1768, 1775 (1998);
see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991) (drawing its title from Noonan's
work); cf VINING, supra note 4, at 264-65.
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the mundane nor the scientific does; commitment to the presence of
persons whose statements and actions may be spread over time both
within and beyond an individual span of life; commitment to the
possibility of authenticity in those statements; commitment to the sense
of language Smith notes, that linguistic meaning is the meaning of a
person, always, whatever we pretend-is always metaphorical if you will;
and finally, commitment to a first fact, basic, on which other conclusions
are built, the fact we are more than one, and, when one of us speaks,
about anything, he or she is only one.
It is true that many call love the something more in the very structure
of the universe than form (that merely is). I have mentioned John
Noonan in law. This something more-call it love-makes possible a
human mind that cares. It is necessary to human authority and
authenticity toward which lawyers work, as necessary to lawyers' work as
oxygen. Since it has no place in the ontological family of science and
mathematics (as oxygen has), its reality for law, lawyers, and legal
thought may be drawn from the "resources" of the other ontological
family that is not mundane, linking law directly in the most basic way to
what is beyond both law and science. If the "individual" and "life,"
which we noted before, can be thought to pass back and forth through
the windows of the anteroom where lawyers work, love may pass through
the walls themselves. Such a basic linkage may indeed be what Smith has
in mind to suggest in discussing the "classical account" at the beginning
of the book, and in his ending.
But to return to the structure of the book and its three "ontological
lumberyards,'' law can still be viewed as having a lumberyard
distinctively legal. All that is necessary to law is not in law's own
lumberyard. All that is necessary to science is not in science's own.
Perhaps what is most necessary to scientific work, individual freedom,
even creativity and trust, would be hard to find "existing" there. But
science remains distinct, as can law. The human individual remains
distinct, one's reality one's own, even though one's own resources of
mind and spirit are manifestly inadequate.
THE "ONTOLOGICAL INVENTORY" OF LAW

Pulling ontological claims generally into the open, as Smith does, will I
think bring the "ontological inventory" of law into the open over time.
Authority is there, as a reality. Purpose is there, and inquiry into
purpose, significant against the background of current presentations of
scientific method in ontological terms-Jacques Monad's is the classic
statement of this kind, that postulates of purpose anywhere in nature,
which would include us, "exist at odds with objective knowledge, face
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away from truth, and are strangers and fundamentally hostile to
12
science. "
The legal mind has its own sense of time, very much associated with
supra-individual persons in law, and with the connection of any
conclusion in law to action, which follows acknowledgement of authority.
Time is the realest thing in the world, we may be inclined to think and
continue to think despite hearing some in physics happily making the
13
ontological statement that it can be shown to be only an illusion. But
the definition or sense of this "it" in one context-ordinary individual life
or the astronomical or the religious or the musical - may not serve at all
well in another, even though carried from context to context is the
experience of reaching to express the same thing, "time." Law is one of
these contexts in and of itself.
As an example, the mundane and apparently clear line between past
and future is does not hold in law. No present day Supreme Court that
says in a perfectly natural way "in 1895 we rejected this argument" is
living in time as experienced by individuals-the Court of Justices long
dead is still "this Court." No endeavor is confined to the clock that has
such difficulty, seen especially in administrative and constitutional law, in
distinguishing past and future, past or "judicial" facts and future or
"legislative" facts, the ex post facto and the prospective. What must be
set aside as subject only to reflection or savoring with delight or regret
(the "past," which is in repose) is not determined in law by the "passing"
of time, scientific or ordinary. What is or is not put behind is a matter of
some choice in law; and whether decisions and events can be remedially
cancelled, or replayed, so that they are really as if they never were, and
do not control individual expectations, is not argued or determined by
invoking usual categories of time past, present, and future. Past, present,
and future are terms that in law mostly express conclusions about where
and how far to direct the force of law- that peculiar force in the world
beyond the weak and the strong.
Perhaps most irreplaceably, the individual lives in law's ontological
inventory, the human individual and, to an increasing degree, the
individual animal. Law's commitment to the fact that we are more than
one is fundamental, not to be shut out of thought methodologically or
14
ontologically, and I will refer here to James Boyd White's work. This
12. JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY 171 (Austryn Wainhouse trans.,
Vintage Books ed. 1972) (1971).
13. E.g., Dennis Overbye, String Theory, at 20, Explains It All (or Not), N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2004, at Fl (discussing the view of Dr. Edward Witten, Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton University).
14. E.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE
(forthcoming 2006).
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can be said noting, all the while, that violent imposition of pure will
occurs through legal processes, and that power is exercised in the name
of the law by those who can secure for the moment some extension of
their individual strength. Oppression, deadening, blind grinding up of
lives, success of efforts to use and manipulate through the processes of
law, all can be admitted-they can hardly be denied. But these are what
15
"the law,'' ontologically speaking, sets its face against. So often these
are just what legal argument is about. Law contains the terms of its own
most powerful and effective criticism, which look to, maintain, and
perhaps it could be said almost give us the individual, together with the
person, and purpose, and living value. Disposing of the disputes of the
day and bringing closure to them before a new day begins disappoints the
hopes of individuals, to be sure, and that closure is done with force if
necessary. But even if closure is forced, attention to and concern for the
disappointed individual can still mark the decision and fuel imagining
new ways to respond in the future. The strength of the individual in legal
thought is not unlike the strength of natural selection in biological
thought, or of force in physics.
We can go so far as "reason" itself, on which Smith has written
16
eloquently here and elsewhere. Reasoning or the rational has for most
an ontological aspe~t. Its presence is often thought to differentiate the
human from the animal. Rationality might be viewed as everywhere and
essentially just consciously staying open to the evidence and fitting
means to ends. But reasoning "scientific" or "logical" often involves
capturing a perception or phenomenon, "time" for instance, or "love,'' or
"life,'' so that it can be boxed and manipulated, and then unitizing it so
that it can be put with other "like" phenomena in a class or group that
can also be manipulated. Any kind of probability or statistics involves
both these, capture and unitizing. They seem to be necessary whenever
seeing something as a system or part of a system, which may in turn be
necessary for manipulation.
Legal thought eventually departs from this. Capturing eliminates the
continuous unfoldingness of things and the reality of the necessity of
assent to characterizations of perception, unitizing eliminates the reality
of individuality-both realities, again, being part of the "ontological
inventory" of law. The signal of a move from the rational and reasoning
in law to the rational and reasoning as it proceeds in other fields often is
substitution of an abstract symbol for a word, phrase, or sentence of
human language. This is not to say that capturing and unitizing are not
15. See Joseph Vining, The Cosmological Question: A Response lo Milner S. Ball's All
the Company of Heaven, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2024 (1996).
16. E.g., Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1263, 1282-1306 (2004).
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useful in human affairs. But it may be to say that the usefulness in
human affairs of such reasoning extends only to the point where the
force of law, that proceeds from human imagination and creativity, is
brought to bear on a situation and the future emerging from it. We can
note that philosophy has some of law's rationality, since the practice of
philosophy is often discussion of similar questions in something of the
same way but using a different set of central texts. But there is to be seen
in philosophy far more a floating logic, unmoored to the assent of
individuals or the expression of a person in whom individuals are joined,
and, to go with it, a floating meaning for propositions, unconnected to
any person, that flirts with literalness in language; and this may be
because focal texts organizing discussion have been generated without
any intrinsic connection to outcomes in the world or responsibility for
outcomes.
FILLING THE "ONTOLOGICAL GAP"

As Smith proceeds in his discussion, I think he cannot help at least
starting to fill the "ontological gap" in which law lives with items from
law's own ontological inventory, point by point, item by item. But there
is a prior matter to be addressed in connection with what he calls
"reigning" ontological orthodoxies. That is a claim made for some of
them to totality, a quality recalling the totalitarian cosmologies in
twentieth century social and political thought-the absence of the
individual in them being the most evident connection. Smith is very
much addressing this also in the structure of Law's Quandary. The
process of elimination in the book does away with their "dynastic"
aspect, to use his nice word, not the ontological families themselves. One
can still hear the Big Bang, love one's primate cousins as cousins, and fly
in airplanes with confidence after Smith is through.
Totality is the first claim to be addressed for purposes just of
understanding, which I think is Smith's first object and is reflected in his
title word "Quandary." Just understanding, to help with a state of
confusion, perplexity, oddness-pressing more and more, he notes, as
early twentieth-century confidence faded that law's difference would
fade. To go perhaps one step beyond, the twentieth century that we can
now look back on was a century in which, far from merely persisting, the
legal mind demonstrated new strength, protecting against the seduction
of totalities of all kinds that emerged and were tried, and then, finally,
protecting against the individual isolation and radical ignorance
celebrated in the short-lived academic orthodoxy of postmodernism at
the century's end.
Understanding, however, is only the first of Smith's purposes. The
situation he is offering to sort out and help with is not psychological only,
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most certainly not academic only. In fact, within the family or dynasty
Smith calls "scientific" there is competition for a total occupation of the
human mind, "realist" mathematicians competing with some schools of
biologists and some schools of physicists; some schools of physicists
competing with some schools of biologists; all of them set against
historicists in the social sciences-history of science, cultural history,
sociology and anthropology. A lawyer might leave them to work it out
over time and move themselves away from each wanting all, to the point
where they acknowledge other ontological worlds than their own, had
the twentieth century not shown the stakes to be so high in human life
and suffering if any one of these total claims should come to occupy the
field, which is the human mind. Where Smith leaves us is a safer place
than we were before.
THE NATURALNESS OF THE CONSTRUCTED AUTHOR

Let me move finally from the question whether law has an "ontological
family" of its own to the question that occupies almost a third of the
book, the question of the "constructed author." My comment here is
that the phrase "constructed author" should not be taken to suggest
artificiality as opposed to, shall we say, "naturalness." Judges listening
for the voice of the law, for which or whom they will speak, do what we
all do when we listen to an individual speak over time and sort out what
to take seriously and what not, how to read words as used, and what to
17
treat as a mistake or as spoken when the individual is "not himself. "
That "himself" is a perception of our own, built up over time. Being our
own, and ourselves having done the work of sorting to build it up, it is
something of a creation of our own. But we would not do the work
without faith or belief in the fact that there is a person to be heard that
we are trying to hear. I think again and again how well· Wordsworth
presented "all the mighty world [o]f eye and ear,'' with which he
unabashedly said he was in love: "[o]f eye and ear,'' he said, "both what
they half-create, [a)nd what perceive." 18 We do half-create, but only halfcreate-what we see and hear and love is real. We sort and choose and
decide, within the structure of a sentence, within the confines of a text, in

17. How do you read Smith, for example, in the last sentence of Part II of the book,
on page 96: "Thus far, it seems, the suspicion of low-talk as nonsense stands unrebutted"?
And I can hope readers' eyes blur as a quotation from me passes before them, '"(W]hat
are it and our own but points to a larger mind(?]"' with missing letters sliding in so that
"points" becomes "pointers." SMITH, supra note 1, at 173 (quoting VINING, supra note 4,
at 220).
18. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Lines Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey, in
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH: THE MAJOR WORKS 131, 134 (Stephen Gill ed., rev. ed. 2000).
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a conversation extending over a lifetime. We do this too in the universe
of texts we admit into "legislation" or "precedent."
Moreover, the very meaning of the words being read is constructed at
the same time the author is constructed, both of them in tandem, and
there is surely no one to say what the necessary meaning of a word is, no
one anywhere with authority of that kind: the meaning given and taken
may be almost new. The difference between the experience of listening
to a person to whom we give an individual name, and the equally natural
experience of listening to the persons that populate law and are not
enfleshed, does not lie in what is heard in the mind. The persons in law
to whom we give names like "The Court" or "Congress" or "The
Commission" speak through us when we speak for them, and the
moment any of us speaks for such a person, the statement is taken up by
others to be sorted, interpreted, discarded, and otherwise decided about
in a way that is not very different from what others do with what we say
on our own behalf. How far we can go toward the existence of such
19
persons equivalent to the existence of individual persons I do not know.
But we cannot ignore how far we do go, how virtually all in law actually
act and speak today, and it is one of the achievements of Law's
Quandary to make us look at it.
There are special difficulties and differences when we move to multiauthored legal texts, or texts that are reauthored when put to a vote
insofar as the understanding of the voter is thought to be a source of the
text's meaning. (I say "insofar" because in perhaps all cases of voting the
body within which votes are cast, and in whose name these words and
sentences are uttered, is itself read as speaking not for itself but for
another.) Smith surveys the difficulties without resolution. The marks
on paper that we call legislation are read, and not as products of the
forces that made them in the legislative machinery. They are read in the
closest way. The mere fact of such close reading can be taken as
evidence of belief we are not ready to admit, or, as I have suggested
elsewhere,20 it may be a necessary and even desirable playing of a trick
upon ourselves, tearing arbitrary holes in what would otherwise be too
confining a structure constantly being built up. A generation ago Grant
21
Gilmore and Guido Calabresi after him proposed that as a matter of
empirical observation, lawyers and courts approach the extensive
19. A helpful exploration can be found in w. M. GELDART, LEGAL PERSONALITY
(1924).
20. See JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 110-41
(1986); Joseph Vining, Generalization in Interpretive Theory, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring
1990, at 1, reprinted in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 1 (Robert Post ed., 1991).
21. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95-98 (1977).
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modern landscape of legislative materials rather as they approach
common law materials. It does seem that in any particular instance of
legislation it is possible for a spirit to grip a fractured group and lead
them toward a joint expression. We see such a spirit constantly searched
for in holding corporate bodies genuinely responsible for disregard of
values expressed and protected in law, the Andersen22 case being only the
most recent.
We go back to the actual ontology of law and to the question of
entertaining the reality of inspiration, knitting things together over time
in ways we are surprised by and happy to accept. "Inspiration," that
Smith takes up in his discussion of Socrates at the very end, is one of the
great questions and a live issue in arguments about the status of jointly
authored texts and texts reauthored through voting on them.
"Inspiration" may be there in the inventory of legal ontology. Certainly
it has no place in systems of thought that deny or have no place for spirit.
Inspiration, spirit, and, I think, the truly creative are bound together. All
are there, or none are there, and as Smith helps us see, none are there in
those forms of thought that are so widely imagined to be the ultimate end
of thinking itself.

Law's Quandary is in part life's quandary. We hardly know what we
ourselves think, individually, in advance of trying to speak or write. We
discover it. We should not be surprised that we hardly know what we
think about the nature of law, so necessary to ordinary life, necessary
even to science. We discover that too, and we work on it, and most
significantly, none of us has much time to do it. We enter into law, and
we leave as others are taking it up. But occasionally we can jump ahead
of our own work and discovery, reading a book as a revelation-those
are books we keep in a special place, and everyone has his or her own
collection. Steven Smith's book will be entering many of those
collections. And then too, always in the background of speaking about
law is hearing and speaking for law, which we are also doing, and the one
does blend with the other. The very capacity to read this book together,
with varying responses we put to one another, is a demonstration of that
basic ontological faith, law's faith, that beyond the individual speaking
who is only one speaking, there is a "we," in reality, with whom we
individually are identified during our time in the most wonderful way,
never starting from scratch, and whom we wish well in the undertaking to
understand and protect that will go on beyond our time.
22.

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).

